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Abstract In this essay, one of Derrida’s early texts, Plato’s pharmacy, is analysed in 
detail, more specifically in relation to its reflections on writing and its relation to law. 
This analysis takes place with reference to a number of Derrida’s other texts, in 
particular those on Freud. It is especially Freud’s texts on dream interpretation and 
on the dream-work which are of assistance in understanding the background to 
Derrida’s analysis of writing in Plato’s pharmacy. The essay shows the close relation 
between Derrida’s analysis of Plato’s texts and Freud’s study of the dream-work. The 
forces at work in dreams, it appears, are at play in all texts, which in turn explains 
Derrida’s contentions in relation to the pharmakon as providing the condition of 
possibility of Plato’s texts. The essay furthermore points to the continuity between 
this ‘early’ text of Derrida and his ‘later’, seemingly more politico-legal texts of the 
1990s. A close reading of Plato’s pharmacy, with its investigation via ‘writing’ of the 
foundations of metaphysics, and thus also of the Western concept of law, is obligatory 
should one wish to comprehend how Derrida attempts to exceed the restricted 
economy of metaphysics through his analysis of concepts such as justice and 
hospitality. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In his famous early essay stemming from 1972, Plato’s pharmacy, Derrida makes the 
contention that philosophy, characterised by rational thinking, and therefore also 
law, as one of its offshoots, are founded on sorcery [18, pp. 69-186]. Derrida’s essay 
with its seemingly outrageous contention, has, as could perhaps have been expected, 
received a mixed response from legal scholars. On the negative side, the essay has 
been viewed as a good illustration of Derrida’s use of irritating, punning, irrationalist, 
and self-defeating arguments, followed by the conclusion that deconstruction is 
clearly irrelevant for law. Those more favourably inclined towards Derrida have 
mostly read this text, specifically because of the seemingly double meaning of 
pharmakon which Derrida exploits there, as pointing to the multiple meanings which 
a text can possibly convey. In what has probably become the most-cited essay on the 
relation between law and deconstruction, deconstruction is, inter alia based on 
Plato’s pharmacy and the speech/writing opposition enquired into there, presented 
as a tool for purposes of legal argumentation, a method in other words, for the 
temporary reversal of conceptual oppositions in law with the aim ultimately of 
showing that they are mutually dependent. After Derrida’s Force of law: The 
“mystical foundation of authority” [16, pp. 230-298] interest in Plato’s pharmacy in 
  
2 
 
the legal context has waned significantly. Because of a wide-spread belief in Derrida’s 
‘ethical turn’, Plato’s pharmacy is no longer viewed as of much importance in 
understanding Derrida’s thinking in relation to law and justice. The present essay will 
argue for the continuing importance of Plato’s pharmacy in the legal context. 
Through a detailed analysis of the main ‘themes’ of Plato’s pharmacy, it will 
furthermore be contended that although this text can indeed be read as ‘textbook 
example’ of a deconstructive reading, much more is at stake than what at first meets 
the eye. In this respect, the influence of Freud on Derrida’s reading will specifically be 
enquired into. As we will see by enquiring into the relation between texts, dreams and 
the laws applicable to their construction; the speech/writing opposition; the 
pharmakon; imitation in general; the pharmakos; the move from mythos to logos; 
and the ‘notions’ of general writing and the trace, Derrida’s seemingly arbitrary and 
haphazard playing with words in Plato’s pharmacy involves a specific and very 
rigorous ‘application’ of Freud’s insights in relation to the interpretation of dreams, to 
texts in general. Texts are, like dreams, not controlled by the intentions of their 
authors. This should not lead to the simplistic conclusion that texts therefore mean 
whatever Derrida (or anyone else) wants them to mean. Plato’s pharmacy, as is the 
case with many other texts of Derrida, enquires into the foundations of metaphysics 
(and therefore also of law) through a rigorous reading of philosophical texts. In going 
beyond the intentions of the author, Derrida’s readings are motivated by and point in 
each instance to what can be referred to as a ‘desire’ that goes beyond philosophy; a 
‘desire’, as we will see, that makes philosophy possible and which, as the concluding 
paragraph will make clear, poses a radical challenge to law. This ‘desire’ moreover 
informs Derrida’s understanding of justice in Force of law [16, pp. 230-298].1 
 
2 Texts and the construction of dreams 
 
In the introductory paragraph, the notion of a ‘text’ was referred to a few times. 
Because of its importance for our reading of Plato’s pharmacy, it requires further 
elaboration here. In the first few pages of Plato’s pharmacy, Derrida invokes the 
notions of weaving, fabric (textile) and a web, as synonyms for the notion of a ‘text’ 
[18, pp. 69-71].2 It is noteworthy that Freud uses similar terminology in the context of 
dreams, speaking of the ‘material’ or fabric (Stoff) of a dream which is transformed by 
the dream-work into the manifest dream [21, vol XV p. 223]. Freud also refers to the 
‘material out of which the dream was woven’ (Material, aus dem der Traum 
gesponnen ist) and to the ‘texture’ (Gewebe) of the dream [21, vol  IV pp. 194, 310]. 
                                                 
1
 This aspect can for reasons of space not be explored in the present essay in detail. This has been done 
elsewhere. 
2
 See also Derrida [5, pp. 111-112]. Gasché [22, pp. 95-105] points out that in Plato, weaving (symploke) plays 
an important dialectical role, whereas in Derrida, especially in Plato’s pharmacy, weaving is generalized so as to 
show the relation of dialectics to an alterity which is its condition of possibility as well as impossibility. The 
other of dialectics, that which was understood to be negativity, is shown to no longer be its other, to no longer 
belong to it, to not even be a negative. The other in Derrida’s thinking ‘is irretrievably plural and cannot be 
assimilated, digested, represented, or thought as such, and hence put to work by the system of metaphysics’ (at p. 
103). The pharmakon is one of the names for this otherness. The reading of Plato’s pharmacy presented in the 
present essay ties in closely with that of Gasché, although here the other will be explored in closer relation to a 
certain thinking of Freud; see also Kamuf [26] where the same theme of weaving is at stake in an analysis of 
Plato’s pharmacy. 
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Insofar as the production of the manifest content of the dream is concerned, this 
occurs through censorship or repression of what Freud refers to as the latent dream-
thoughts or unconscious mental acts [21, vol V p. 514; 5, vol XV p. 183]. The 
production of a dream, Freud furthermore points out, is not an arbitrary process, but 
proceeds according to certain rules or mechanisms, the most important of which are 
(1) condensation, the manifest dream consisting of an abbreviated ‘translation’ of the 
latent dream-thoughts,3 and (2) the displacement of energy along chains of 
association involving contiguity or similarity.4  One can in addition, because of their 
importance in the present context, mention the importance in dream-work of (3) 
considerations of representability, that is, the selection and transformation 
undergone by latent dream-thoughts to enable them to be represented, preferably 
towards pictorial substitutes) as well as (4) secondary revision, so as to enable the 
dream to be presented in a relatively coherent manner.5 Freud does not restrict the 
application of these mechanisms to the production of dreams. They apply also in the 
case of slips of the tongue (or pen) and other ‘faulty acts’, in jokes, in works of art, in 
scientific research, in religion, and in culture in general.6 This is because unconscious 
processes always remain at work, also in wakeful life, and are not restricted to 
neurotics. Freud’s analysis of these manifestations of the unconscious, however 
predominantly remained occupied with the effect of early childhood memories and 
the Oedipus complex. Derrida’s contention in Plato’s pharmacy that these 
mechanisms apply to ‘texts’ in general therefore finds direct support in Freud’s 
writings. Derrida’s extended notion of a ‘text’ takes on board almost all of the above 
ideas in relation to the construction of dreams, and includes within it ‘all the 
structures called “real,” “economic,” “historical,” socio-institutional, in short: all 
possible referents’, which ties in with his remark that ‘there is nothing outside of the 
text’ [10, p. 148; 6, p. 158]. For Freud, dream interpretation, as well as the 
interpretation of manifestations of the unconscious in wakeful activities, is about the 
disentanglement of their texture [21, vol V p. 515]. Derrida’s reading of texts has a 
similar concern [5, pp. 111-113; 18, pp. 69, 72], albeit with a slight but important 
difference, which Freud already anticipated.  
 
The way in which the dream-work proceeds is nonetheless not fully explained by the 
mechanisms described above. In his Revision of dream theory Freud somewhat 
modestly, but significantly, remarks in this regard that ‘we have not yet understood’ 
the ‘rules’ according to which the manifest dream is constructed [21, vol XXII pp. 12, 
13]. This remark appears to tie in closely with a passage from The interpretation of 
                                                 
3
 According to Freud [21, vol XV p. 171], this takes place inter alia ‘by latent elements which have something in 
common being combined and fused into a single unity in the manifest dream’; see further Freud [21, vol IV pp. 
279-304]. 
4
 See in general, Freud [21, vol IV pp. 305-309; vol V pp. 514-515; vol XV pp. 170-183; vol XIX pp. 12-13]. 
5
 See in general, Laplanche and Pontalis [28, pp. 125, 389-390, 412] and Freud [21, vol V pp. 339-349, 488-
508]. 
6
 See inter alia Freud [21] vol VI (The psychopathology of everyday life); vol VIII (Jokes and their relation to 
the unconscious); vol IX pp. 1-95 (Jensen’s Gradiva); vol XI pp. 57-137 (Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of 
his childhood); vol XIII (Totem and taboo); vol XXI pp. 1-56 (The future of an illusion); vol XXIII pp. 1-137 
(Moses and monotheism). 
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dreams [21, vol V p. 525] which in turn echoes well with Plato’s pharmacy and 
requires quotation here in full:  
 
There is often a passage in even the most thoroughly interpreted dream which has 
to be left obscure; this is because we become aware during the work of 
interpretation that at that point there is a tangle of dream-thoughts which cannot 
be unravelled and which moreover adds nothing to our knowledge of the content of 
the dream. This is the dream’s navel, the spot where it reaches down into the 
unknown. The dream-thoughts to which we are led by interpretation cannot, from 
the nature of things, have any definite endings; they are bound to branch out in 
every direction into the intricate network of our world of thought. It is at some 
point where this meshwork is particularly close that the dream-wish grows up, like 
a mushroom out off its mycelium.7 
 
This passage together with the remark of Freud referred to above, could be read as an 
acknowledgement that what is at stake at the ‘origin’ of the formation of dreams and 
texts is not something which is capable of being grasped by knowledge or concepts, 
and is therefore heterogeneous to signified sense.8 This limit or resistance to dream 
interpretation seems to be a result of a difference within the exertion of forces [14, p. 
13; 7, pp. 201, 211], which in turn motivates partially the introduction by Derrida of 
the ‘concept’ of différance [5, pp. 148-152]. The latter ‘concept’, apart from alluding to 
the deference and delay of unreserved expenditure, points at the same time to 
differences in force, and more specifically to what could be referred to as the ‘weakest 
force’ which remains beyond knowledge, that is, Freud’s death drive [5, pp. 150-151].9 
Différance, which can, as we will see,  also be named the pharmakon, dissemination, 
the trace, general writing, etc, in other words points to the representation of that 
which cannot be represented as such. This ‘notion’ lies at the heart of Plato’s 
pharmacy and Derrida [18, p. 69] introduces it on the first page when he remarks on 
this law – the law of the composition of texts. In ‘untangling’ Plato’s texts, this law 
will compel him to point to that spot in the texts, which, as in the case of dreams, 
cannot be untied, which resists analysis and an identifiable meaning.  
 
3 Speech and Writing 
 
An analysis of the Phaedrus [36] and other texts seems to suggest that Plato, through 
the mouth of Socrates, has an aversion to writing, that he prefers the living, breathing 
purity of speech. Plato seems to have a similar prejudice towards painting and the 
other imitative arts such as poetry and sculpture. Even though a painting seems alive, 
                                                 
7
 See also Freud [21, vol IV p. 111 n 1]. 
8
 This is explored by Derrida [14, pp. 1-38], where he points to the weaving metaphors employed in the passage 
quoted above and brings this ‘resistance’ to analysis in relation to Freud’s elaboration of the repetition 
compulsion and death drive, inter alia in Beyond the pleasure principle [21, vol XVIII pp. 1-64]. Plato’s 
pharmacy and the figure of the pharmakon are incidentally also referred to here (at pp. 30-31). 
9
 In devising this neologism, Derrida was presumably not unaware of Freud’s remark in The interpretation of 
dreams [21, vol V pp. 356-357] that ‘[i]n the case of unintelligible neologisms…it is worth considering whether 
they may not be put together from components with a sexual meaning’. The analysis which follows seems to 
confirm thus postulation. 
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when one questions it, it remains silent, Socrates notes, just like writing [36, p. 
275d].10 Plato elsewhere also records his opposition to sorcery, prophetic powers, 
magic, and the casters of spells, calling for harsh punishment, including expulsion 
from the social arena for those who engage in these activities [18, pp. 99-100]. 
Writing is denigrated by Plato as a fallen kind of speech, as a mere aid, dangerous and 
secondary to living memory; as corrupting originary meaning; as dead or empty 
repetition; as dead and rigid knowledge. Compared to writing, speech involves living 
memory, remembering the aletheia of the eidos before the fall of the soul into the 
body. It thus also involves repetition, but the repetition of truth which presents the 
eidos [18, pp. 135-136]. This distinction does not however as yet explain fully Plato’s 
seemingly negative views on writing. Plato’s relation to the sophists casts somewhat 
more light on this. As is well-known, Plato finds the views of the sophists 
objectionable [18, p. 108]. It is the sophists who wrote speeches for use by litigants 
rather than relying on living discourse (logos). The further problem with these 
speeches, as with the one of Lysias (a sophist) which Phaedrus reads to Socrates (and 
that Phaedrus is attempting to learn by heart) is according to Socrates that they have 
no head or tail; the parts of the speech appear to have been thrown together at 
random; they are in other words not organised like a living being; they also repeat the 
same thing over and over again without being concerned with the truth.11 When one 
asks a sophist a question, Socrates comments, he will be unable to give you an 
answer, similar to what happens when you read a book [18, p. 137]. This is because 
the sophists do not rely on living memory (mnēmē), but trade in mere repetition 
(hupomnēsis). Plato’s condemnation of writing does not however appear to be 
consistent. At other points in the dialogue, which will be discussed in more detail 
below, he points to the necessity, value and importance of writing. Informing this 
contradiction in the Phaedrus, which according to Derrida is not due to an oversight, 
but strictly regulated [18, p. 72], is the analogy which Freud uses to explain the way in 
which contradictions are dealt with in dreams, what is sometimes referred to as 
kettle-logic: A man who is charged with having given back a borrowed kettle in 
damaged condition argues firstly that the kettle was not damaged when given back; 
secondly, that it was already damaged when he borrowed it; and thirdly, that he never 
borrowed the kettle [21, vol IV pp. 119-120; 18, p. 113]. There is in other words an a-
logic at stake in Plato’s pharmacy, which nevertheless takes place according to strict 
rules. Before we enquire further into this strange contradiction, it is first necessary to 
turn to the pharmakon which as we will see, contains contradictions within itself. 
 
4 The pharmakon 
 
One of the focus points of Derrida’s analysis in Plato’s pharmacy, and which as 
mentioned above has caught the attention of legal (and other) scholars, is the word 
pharmakon which appears a number of times in the Phaedrus as well as other texts 
                                                 
10
 Page number references in Plato’s texts will be to the page numbers indicated in the margins of these texts. 
11
 The Phaedrus has incidentally been criticised in similar terms for many centuries. It has, specifically because 
of the inclusion of the Egyptian myth on the invention of writing which we will discuss below, been regarded as 
either the work of a young, immature Plato or an old Plato, close to senility [18, pp. 71-72].  
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of Plato and which can be translated as remedy, poison, drug, medicine, recipe, 
perfume, paint (an artificial tint), and as philter (a love or magic potion, a charm) [18, 
pp. 98-118, 132, 142]. At stake in the pharmakon is clearly something analogous to 
the mechanisms of dream-work, and more specifically of condensation or the 
characteristic of over-determination, that is, an element in the content of the dream 
‘is not derived from a single element in the dream-thoughts, but may be traced back 
to a whole number’ and vice versa [21, vol V pp. 652-653]. The different elements out 
of which the pharmakon is constituted seem more specifically to include allusions to 
life, death, and (sexual) pleasure.12 It is of great importance to note that for Derrida 
these different possibilities of translation are not simply a matter of ambiguity or 
polysemy, but of a word with no self-identical meaning.13 It is moreover, as will 
become clear, ‘the prior medium in which differentiation in general is produced’ [18, 
p. 129]. As we will see, and as one could expect with a word having no self-identity, it 
will be impossible for Plato to control the meaning of the pharmakon in the different 
contexts he uses the word. The attempts by translators of the Phaedrus and other 
texts of Plato to give to the pharmakon a specific meaning within a certain context 
(either remedy or poison) is no doubt legitimate within metaphysical logic, but it also 
closes down the playfulness of this word, the link it establishes between an ‘inside’ 
and an ‘outside’.14 Translations of this word tend to confirm the boundary between an 
inside and an outside, thereby confirming the power and logic of metaphysics without 
concerning themselves with what makes this tradition possible. For Derrida [18, p. 
77], the difficulty in tying down the meaning of pharmakon lies not so much in the 
translation from one philosophical language (here, Greek) into others, but in 
transferring what is actually a non-philosopheme into a philosopheme.  
 
The importance of the pharmakon within the context of a discussion of the 
speech/writing distinction lies in the fact that Plato specifically refers to writing as a 
pharmakon. It is more specifically because of the pharmakon of a written text (the 
written speech of Lysias about love which Phaedrus - the young man Socrates is 
attempting to convince to become his lover [37, p. 72] - hides under his cloak) that 
Socrates is charmed or seduced into leaving the shelters of the city walls, the proper 
place where he usually learns, teaches, speaks and engages in dialogue, and which 
                                                 
12
 In relation to the pharmakon, it is worth mentioning Freud’s ‘The antithetical meaning of primal words 
(Urworte) [21, vol XI pp. 155-161; vol XV pp. 179-180] as well as his expression of agreement in The 
interpretation of Ddreams with Hans Sperber that ‘all primal words referred to sexual things but afterwards lost 
their sexual meaning through being applied to other things and activities which were compared with the sexual 
ones’ [21, vol V p. 352]; see further Freud [21, vol XV p. 167]. One of Derrida’s texts which come very close to, 
but nonetheless goes beyond this Freudian analysis is ‘A number of yes’ where he analyses the boundless ‘yes’ 
at the ‘pre-origin’ of language, through a reading of Michel de Certeau [20, pp. 231-240]. The latter text ties in 
with the analysis in par 8 below. 
13
 See also Meyer [32, pp. 503-504], Brogan [2, pp. 8-13], Naas [34, pp. 44, 49], and Hobson [23, pp. 64-65]. 
The early commentaries on Plato’s pharmacy, by Norris [35, pp. 28-45], Culler [4, pp. 142-144] and Johnson 
[24] which were relied on by legal scholars, may have contributed to the many misunderstandings surrounding 
this text. Although these latter commentaries show a great deal of insight in relation to Derrida’s texts, they can 
and have been read to suggest that what is at stake in the pharmakon is simply a double meaning, that is, remedy 
and poison.  
14
 See further par 5 below. 
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lies, as Derrida argues, at the ‘foundation’ of the Phaedrus [18, p. 76]. As Socrates 
says to Phaedrus – 
 
But you, I think, have found a potion [pharmakon] to charm me into leaving … you 
can lead me all over Attica or anywhere else you like simply by waving in front of 
me the leaves of a book containing a speech [36, p. 230e].  
 
The Phaedrus weaves together the themes of writing, truth, love,15 seduction, desire, 
pleasure, and death. As Socrates and Phaedrus are on their way to the place next to 
the river Ilisus where their dialogue about love and writing will take place, Socrates 
recounts the legend of Boreas’s abduction of the virgin Orithyia. This is said to have 
happened close to where Socrates and Phaedrus will recline under a tree. The relation 
between the flowing water of a stream, fabric, and sexual desire is hinted at here, as 
well as elsewhere in Plato’s texts [36, pp.  251d, 255c; 18, pp. 74-75].16 Socrates at this 
point mockingly refers to the sophoi (wise) who would have attempted to give a 
learned, rationalist explanation of the myth by contending that it was while she was 
playing with Pharmacia17 that a gust of the North Wind blew Orithyia over the rocks 
and that after having been killed in this way she was seized by Boreas.18 When asked 
by Phaedrus whether he believes in the truth of this legend,19 Socrates responds that 
he does not have time to concern himself with questions such as these; of much 
greater importance is the Delphic inscription instructing one to know oneself. Before 
                                                 
15
 Socrates in the Phaedrus incidentally defines love as ‘a kind of madness’; Plato [36, p. 265a]. 
16
 See also Plato’s Cratylus at pp. 400d and 419e-420b. Derrida [18, p. 75] refers in this context to the 
‘diaphanous purity’ (in the sense of a texture so fine to permit seeing through) of the waters, which must have 
welcomed and drawn Orithyia and Pharmaceia like a spell, where Socrates and Phaedrus are reclining. It is 
furthermore interesting to note at this point that Lévi-Strauss [30, pp. 378-405] detects a close relation in myth 
between weaving and pubic hair.   
17
 The word Pharmacia (Pharmakeia), Derrida [18, p. 75] notes, is also a common noun used to refer to the 
administration of the pharmakon, or drug: poison and/or medicine, hinting that it was through poisoning (or 
perhaps the pleasurable or blind use of a drug that she lost her life (at 78)). See also Derrida [11, pp. 236-237, 
240-241] for a reflection on the reasons for society’s condemnation of the drug addict.  
18
 In what has up until now been the most detailed discussion of Plato’s Pharmacy in the legal context, Brosnan 
[3, pp. 365-376] contends (at 366) that Derrida’s remark that ‘[t]hrough her games, Pharmacia has dragged down 
to death a virginal purity and an unpenetrated interior’ [18, p. 75] is ‘somewhat illogical’ (the words italicized by 
me is the only part of the sentence quoted by Brosnan), in view of the Phaedrus suggesting instead that Boreas 
was the one responsible. Brosnan’s assessment is another indication (together with his view that Derrida’s word-
play and reversals of oppositions are simply techniques, or ‘an intensely skeptical method’ (at 371), and his 
implication that Derrida seeks to convince us of some kind of truth in a way similar to a work of modernist art 
(at 370-371)) of the carelessness with which he reads Plato’s pharmacy. According to Brosnan (at 366), 
Derrida’s ‘ultimate conclusion’, which ‘is not clearly stated in so many words’ is that the privilege of speech in 
the speech/writing opposition ‘is wrong’. Both speech and writing, he contends, instead share the trait of being 
distanced from immediate truth or presence. The perplexity of the author faced with this text appears further 
from the rhetorical questions posed at the end of his analysis of Derrida’s essay (at 372): ‘Where do you go with 
an insight or claim that two things conventionally viewed as opposites are “in a sense,” the same thing? That is 
what is most conspicuously absent from Derrida’s account of the Phaedrus, a sense of just what is at stake if you 
choose to accept this view. What does it matter if, as Derrida claims, the entire history of Western philosophy 
can be re-explained as a meta-conflict of speech vs. writing? We are left to guess what, if anything, would be 
different’ (footnote omitted). It is remarkable that this acknowledged lack of comprehension does not reduce the 
author to silence, but (revealingly) rather seems to incite him into making the accusations against Derrida 
referred to above. In this regard the remarks of Freud [21, vol XI p. 39] in relation to resistance to psychoanalysis 
appear apposite. 
19
 In other accounts Boreas is furthermore said to have raped her and she, having become an immortal goddess, 
to have borne him a number of children. 
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the reading by Phaedrus starts, there is therefore at first a welcome and then a 
sending-off or dismissal of myth in the name of truth [18, pp. 73, 74, and 77].20 It is 
moreover on the basis of a written text which instructs Socrates to attain the truth of 
self-knowledge in the name of which the dialogue in the Phaedrus will take place and 
not in the name of the transparent immediacy of self-presence as one would perhaps 
have expected in light of Plato’s philosophy. As Derrida [18, p. 74] furthermore points 
out, a similar role is played by the fable of the origin of the cicadas which Socrates 
recounts later in the dialogue. The cicadas, it is said, were at first people who when 
singing was invented by the Muses were so overwhelmed by the pleasure thereof that 
they did not eat or drink anymore but kept on singing until they died, without even 
realising it. The gift the Muses gave them was that they would not need to eat or 
drink, but immediately after birth would start singing until they die. After death they 
would go to the Muses and inform them of those who honoured them, either through 
dance, love or philosophy. It is for this reason, Socrates says, that they should not fall 
asleep by the river like slaves or sheep while the cicadas sing, but should engage in 
discourse (logos). We find here another allusion to the dissolution of identity, of 
death and absolute pleasure as the conditions of possibility of dialogue (and truth).  
 
The pharmakon again comes to the fore in the myth of the god Theuth concerning the 
value of writing which is told by Socrates [18, pp. 78-79]. Theuth wanted to introduce 
the art of writing to the Egyptians as a pharmakon (usually translated here as potion 
or remedy) for both memory and wisdom, but Thamus, the King of Egypt (also the 
sun-king, the father of the gods, and Ammon) thought of it as a useless art which 
would have the opposite effect (a poison) for the reasons indicated above. The king, 
presented as the father of the living logos (speech, reason, argument), thus refuses 
the offering or gift of writing [18, p. 81]. The king, Derrida notes, treats writing as if it 
is something outside of him and beneath him; he cannot write, and this ignorance 
confirms his sovereign independence. He regards writing not only as useless, but as a 
mischief and as a menace. After having noted the prophetic judgment of the King, 
Socrates proceeds to translate the prophecy into reason, in order to, as Derrida [18, p. 
135] puts it, ‘uphold … the divine, royal, paternal, solar word’, to transform mythos 
into logos. Metaphysics, it therefore appears, shares with myth this prejudice against 
writing. The same family-structure and the resulting prejudice against writing also 
emerges from Plato’s description of logos as a living being (zoon), similar to other 
living beings [18, p. 84].21 Logos consequently has to ‘properly’ submit to the laws of 
life just like any other living being. To be what it is, logos also requires the attendance 
and presence of its father. Without the father (the paternal presence), as Socrates and 
Derrida [18, p. 82] both note, logos would share the features of writing (a son, an 
                                                 
20
 The invocation and dismissal of the myth in relation to Pharmaceia, with the latter’s allusion to the 
pharmakon ties in with Plato’s analogous treatment of writing. Myth and writing share the same fate in Plato’s 
texts insofar as both are in opposition to logos. They are furthermore both orphans: whereas logos has a father, 
writing has been abandoned by his father and the father of myth is almost impossible to find; Derrida [18, pp. 
145, 183 n. 69]. Their invocation and dismissal is, as should slowly become clear, what provides the condition of 
possibility for the dialogue. 
21
  Writing on the other hand is not a being (on). At the same time it is not simply a non-being either (meon). The 
danger of writing lies exactly in this ability to slip out of the simple opposition or alternative between presence 
and absence [18, p. 111)]. 
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orphan, without being able to defend himself or attend to his own needs). Such an 
orphan-son is not however only regarded with pity; he is also accused for achieving 
emancipation and self-sufficiency. The king thus appears to realise in rejecting the 
gift of writing that what is actually offered here by Theuth, either by ruse or through 
naivety, is not a good remedy or potion, but poison; that behind this gift lies a desire 
for orphan-hood and patricidal subversion. This is because writing can signify on its 
own, not needing the presence of the father-author. Logos on the other hand is a well-
behaved, sane, sensible and grateful son [18, p. 163].22  
 
5 Imitation and the pharmakon 
 
As we saw earlier, Plato condemns both writing and painting for their silence when 
questioned. They simply repeat the same thing over and over again. Plato’s model for 
painting is representation, a drawing of the living [18, pp. 137-138]. In order to 
explain the extent to which painting is removed from the truth, Socrates in the 
Republic [36, pp. 596-598] revealingly invokes the example of tables and beds.23 
Socrates then proceeds, with reference only to a bed, to explain the difference 
between God, the carpenter and the painter of a bed, the latter being a mere imitator 
[18, p. 139)]. Writing is similarly supposed to paint a living word. Derrida [18, p. 137] 
contends that this common silence, this inability to communicate, when measured 
against the demands of the logos arises from the fact that they (writing and painting) 
are interrogated as presumed representatives of the spoken word. When interrogated 
in this vein they are clearly good for nothing. This view on writing (and painting), 
Derrida [18, p. 138] asserts, stems directly from the phonetic writing system that 
existed in Greece in terms of which writing was viewed as representing the signs of 
voice. Kamuf [25, p. 31] furthermore points out in this regard that writing is viewed - 
 
as deriving from speech because it is thought of as purely phonetic transcription. It 
mirrors speech but is less apt than speech to restore the “thing itself,” the referent, 
idea, or signified which, in one way or another, occupies the place of a pure 
intelligibility that has never “fallen” into the sensible realm of the exterior sign or 
symbol, and that therefore always remains present to itself. 
 
Although writing is similar to the other forms of mimesis in that it is a representation 
of something living, writing is regarded as the worst form of representation. Painting 
and sculpture are silent arts, but their silence is ‘normal’. Writing denatures to a 
                                                 
22
 There is clearly a similarity between the familial scene depicted here and Freud’s Oedipus complex as well as 
its ideal resolution; see further par 6 below. 
23
 Freud [21, vol V p. 355; vol XV, p. 158] points out that wood in general and tables specifically stand for 
women in dreams, whereas a bed alludes to sexual intercourse: ‘Tables, tables laid out for a meal, and boards 
also stand for women – no doubt by antithesis, since the contours of their bodies are eliminated in the symbols…. 
Since ‘bed and board’ constitute marriage, the latter often takes the place of the former in dreams and the sexual 
complex of ideas is, so far as may be, transposed on to the eating complex.’’ See also Derrida [8, pp. 315-317] 
on the symbolic meaning of the bed in Ernst’s fort/da game; and further Derrida [18, pp. 205, 210, 231, 233]. 
Freud’s insight that matter (Latin: material from mater (mother)) or wood/board/plank represents women in 
dreams, furthermore tells us something of the limit/border (brothel/French: bordel; German Bordell) in Derrida’s 
thinking and specifically in this context, the limit between inside and outside; see further Derrida [9, pp. 54-55].  
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greater extent that which it represents. It aims at representing living speech, but does 
so without providing an image. It simply substitutes the living act of speech and its 
inner truth with dead letters inscribed in space [18, p. 138]. Derrida is of the view that 
this approach to writing tells us something important about philosophy and its 
origins. It is in other words not by accident that writing receives this harsh 
condemnation. Plato’s Republic provides a further insight into what lies behind this 
devaluation of writing. In this text, as noted above, Plato [36, p. 595a] denounces all 
imitators and says that poetry is likely to distort the thought of those who hear it 
unless, and this is important for the rest of our discussion, one has ontological 
knowledge as a drug (pharmakon) in order to counteract it [18, pp. 138-9]. Derrida 
does not regard Plato’s choice of words as merely accidental. Although this may not 
have been Plato’s intention, the specific choice of the word pharmakon in this context 
indicates that the order of knowledge does not simply consist of the transparent order 
of forms and ideas, but is in the first place a drug or an antidote (pharmakon) which 
serves to oppose another pharmakon. It is here that Derrida [18, p. 139] mentions 
undecidability, which as we can clearly see from the passage that follows, does not 
simply entail the impossibility of deciding between two determinate meanings: 
 
Long before being divided up into occult violence and accurate knowledge, the 
element of the pharmakon is the combat zone between philosophy and its other. 
An element that is in itself, if one can still say so, undecidable. 
 
We will return to this suggestion of philosophy as pharmakon and its implications 
after we have discussed the rest of Derrida’s text. We will see that it ties in closely 
with what was said earlier about the truth and its relation to, or rather its condition of 
possibility being located in, the seduction of Socrates by the written speech which 
Phaedrus hides under his cloak, the Delphic inscription, as well as the mythical 
abduction of Orithyia and the origin of the cicadas.  
 
Let us now discuss in more detail the question of the inside/outside which has been 
briefly referred to a few times already, as this will assist us in understanding the rest 
of Derrida’s analysis. As we saw, for Plato writing is a pharmakon, both remedy and 
poison. It is not effective as a remedy (as Theuth contended) and it is in addition a 
poison. According to Derrida, it appears from Plato’s texts that he, in addition to the 
prejudice against writing, has a general suspicion of drugs or remedies, irrespective of 
the intention with which they are applied.24 This is firstly because of the ambivalent 
nature of remedies. Plato in Protagoras [36, p. 354a] for example views the 
treatments by doctors (pharmaka) as never simply beneficial. Some treatments also 
involve pain and thus entail a kind of painful pleasure. Another example of such a 
painful pleasure mentioned in the Philebus [36, p. 45e] is hubris or ‘the excesses of 
the pleasures of foolish people and those given to debauchery’ which ‘drive them near 
madness and to shrieks of frenzy’ [18, p. 102]. Secondly, and more importantly, the 
pharmakon, in the sense of a drug or medicine, goes against natural life. One should, 
                                                 
24
  See also Derrida [18, p. 78]. 
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according to Plato, not interfere with natural life, with the fixed span of life. One often 
simply makes things worse by using medicine, by applying something from the 
outside of the living body in the case of disease [18, pp. 102-104]. When Plato refers 
to writing as pharmakon, both these reasons seem to be playing themselves out. 
Derrida [18, p. 105] contends that this distinction between an inside and an outside 
informs Plato’s attempt in the Phaedrus and elsewhere (as well as of his translators) 
to force the pharmakon, which as we saw cannot be tied down to any one meaning 
(and by implication death, which is on the ‘inside’ as well as ‘outside’ of life), into a 
metaphysical opposition: remedy versus poison, good versus evil, inside versus 
outside, essence versus appearance, true versus false. This structure also informs 
Plato’s view of writing: writing as pharmakon gives the appearance of being good, of 
being able to assist living memory (mnēmē) from within, but actually, in truth 
(aletheia), it is evil, an external aid to memory (hypomnēsis) and leads to 
forgetfulness (lēthē). Derrida [18, p. 107] in other words attributes the oppositions 
Plato imposes to a prior matrix, that is, the opposition between inside and outside, 
which as we saw hangs together with the definition of the living being Plato 
subscribes to. Derrida [18, p. 111] summarises Plato’s complaint against the sophists 
(and writing, which the sophists incidentally also sometimes condemned [18, pp. 84, 
111, 116-117] as follows: 
 
What Plato is attacking in sophistics, therefore, is not simply recourse to memory 
but, within such recourse, the substitution of the mnemonic device for live 
memory, of the prosthesis for the organ; the perversion that consists of replacing a 
limb by a thing, here, substituting the passive, mechanical, “by-heart” for the active 
reanimation of knowledge, for its reproduction in the present.  
 
This classical (metaphysical) inside/outside logic is not without its difficulties.25 In 
explaining how the human body as well as disease works, Plato interestingly 
mentions the finitude of human life, of death as already inscribed within the 
‘constituted triangles’ of life. As Plato notes in the Timaeus [36, p. 89c], we are all 
born with an ‘allotted span of life, barring unavoidable accidents’. A human being can 
thus be said to have a relation with its absolute other, that is, death. God is different 
in this respect: as a perfect and immortal living being he has no relation to any 
outside as he does not get sick and does not die. Memory, which Plato also refers to in 
terms of life, is itself finite in nature. Like all living organisms, it has certain limits 
and, as Derrida [18, p. 111] notes and Socrates later also confirms in the Phaedrus, it 
is therefore necessary to make use of signs.26 If it was not, if memory was unlimited, it 
would no longer be memory, but like God, amount to infinite self-presence. Memory 
is thus in need of signs to recall that which is not present. Plato nonetheless seems to 
                                                 
25
 See also the discussion of Staikou elsewhere in this Issue on the metaphysical desire for the intact kernel 
(which does not exist) that lies behind this inside/outside logic. 
26
 This can be explained with reference to the Freudian death drive which will be referred to again below. In 
Archive fever [12, p. 11] Derrida comments in this respect that ‘the death drive is also…an aggression and 
destruction (Destruktion) drive’ which inter alia ‘incites forgetfulness, amnesia, the annihilation of memory, as 
mnēmē or anamnēsis’. It is because of death as interior to life (which forgetfulness, here not limiting itself to 
repression (at 19), points to), that signs are needed as an aid to memory; see also Derrida [18, pp. 108 and 113]. 
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dream of a memory without the need for signs or supplements [18, p. 112]. The 
phonic signifier (logos, speech) is therefore preferred, because it appears to stay close 
to living memory, whereas the graphic signifier (writing) moves one step further 
away; falls outside of life. Writing, Thamus points out, ‘will introduce forgetfulness 
into the soul of those who learn it: they will not practice using their memory because 
they will put their trust in writing’ [36, p. 275a)]. Derrida [18, p. 113] however notes 
that ‘writing’, which is here invoked in a special ‘sense’ that will be clarified later, 
cannot be purely external because if it was it would not have been able to affect living 
memory in the way Plato sets out, that is, leading to lēthē (forgetfulness). In spite of 
this seeming ability of ‘writing’ to penetrate the inside, Thamus/Socrates/Plato 
insists, in kettle logic, that writing is purely external to living memory and therefore 
cannot affect it. Furthermore: when one does make use of writing, Socrates says, it is 
because living memory is finite and thus in need of supplementation (the kettle had 
holes in it when I borrowed it) [18, p. 113].  
 
6 The pharmakos 
 
Closely related to the inside/outside logic is Derrida’s analysis of the pharmakos 
which, similar to the pharmakon, is associated with evil and death, repetition and 
exclusion [18, pp. 130-135].  Although this word does not appear in Plato’s text, the 
pharmakos was part of Greek culture and politics at the time. Should Plato’s text(s) 
be viewed as ‘closed’, with a pure inside and an external outside, it would of course be 
illegitimate to read it into Plato’s text. If one however, especially in light of Freud’s 
thinking, understands the ‘notion’ of a text as indicated above, taking account for 
example of forces of association within a particular language, one can, according to 
Derrida, within certain limits, invoke this word in analysing Plato’s text. The word 
pharmakos is furthermore a synonym for pharmakeus, a word we do find in Plato’s 
text, which can be translated as wizard, magician and poisoner.27 It also refers to a 
scapegoat.28 In Athens, the festival of Thargelia (existing in Plato’s time) involved the 
expulsion of two men (sometimes said to have been a man and a woman) to purify the 
city. The city would feed within its walls a number of these ‘outcasts’, often chosen 
because of their ‘unsightly’ appearance, who would then at the appropriate time be 
expelled. These scapegoats would be led through the city whilst being beaten, 
primarily on their genitals (by a plant used to manufacture a magic potion) in order 
to chase out evil from their bodies. The deaths that sometimes followed upon these 
beatings were not the primary aim of the operation [18, p. 133]. A similar ritual was 
followed in the case of a calamity, such as a plague, drought, or famine overtaking the 
city. The pharmakos in other words represented the evil inside the city (harmful and 
therefore feared and treated with caution) that is nonetheless cared for and revered 
(because of its healing and purifying powers); it is both sacred and accursed [18, p. 
134]. These expulsions can be said to have taken place with the primary aim of 
confirming or reconstituting the unity of the city by casting out the representative of 
an unpredictable external threat that could affect or that has affected the inside of the 
                                                 
27
 The mechanism of displacement in dreams, which was referred to in par 2 above is clearly of relevance here. 
28
 See in general, Bremmer [1]. 
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city. The invocation of the pharmakos is important for Derrida in various respects. As 
indicated above, the expulsion at stake here repeats the same procedure as is involved 
in the expulsion of writing, and furthermore shows a relation between this expulsion, 
death and sexual pain/pleasure. Secondly, there is an association with Socrates, 
whose death resembles that of a pharmakos [18, p. 135].29 Plato, Derrida notes, 
writes from out of Socrates’ death. [18, pp. 147-148]. Thirdly, seeing that Oedipus 
was, after the discovery of his ‘crime’, treated in a way similar to the pharmakos, the 
invocation of the latter makes it possible to rethink the founding nature of this 
‘complex’, as for example set out by Freud in Totem and taboo [21, vol XIII]. The 
exclusion of the pharmakos, that is at stake here, ‘precedes’ the Oedipus complex and 
provides its condition of possibility [18, p. 179 n 56; 8].30 Lastly, it illustrates very 
clearly the political stakes of what is at issue in the metaphysical inside/outside logic31 
which is undergoing deconstruction today.32 
 
7 Mythos and logos re-examined 
 
From the discussion above of all the myths referred to in the Phaedrus, an interesting 
connection appears between mythos and logos, in relation to their shared ‘origin’. It 
is usually said that the early period of Greek thinking is characterised by the move 
from mythos to logos. This is indeed the case, but things are also somewhat more 
complex. Logos, even today, still appears to share a number of ideas or rather ‘truths’ 
with myth, specifically in relation to writing [18, p. 78]. Logos has at the same time 
attempted to discard some more dangerous mythological ideas it was uncomfortable 
with. We can see this clearly when we return to the fable told by Socrates of the origin 
of writing. Theuth is presented here as a subordinate character, a technocrat, a clever 
servant. He presents as we saw a tekhnē and pharmakon (writing) to the king after 
having been granted an audience. The king speaks and rejects the gift offered. Theuth 
is silent thereafter. He is not permitted to respond to the King’s judgment [18, pp. 91-
92]. In Egyptian mythology, Thoth and Ra (Ammon) have similar characteristics as 
presented here in Plato’s philosophical text. Plato nonetheless chooses to leave out a 
number of other important features, no doubt for good reason.33 Let us first look at 
                                                 
29
 Socrates was born on the sixth day of the month Thargelion, the day the city is purified [18, p. 135]. Socrates 
furthermore died from drinking hemlock (pharmakon – at 129) after having been sentenced to death for 
offending the gods and misleading the youth, and as we will see in par 7 below, he is sometimes referred to in 
Plato’s dialogues as a pharmakeus (magician). 
30
 This also explains Derrida’s remark that the discourse he engages in here is not strictly speaking a 
psychoanalytical one [18, p. 179 n. 56]. 
31
 Plato incidentally does not stop with the condemnation of writing (and painting), but as Derrida [18] points 
out, proceeds to condemn through reliance on the same structure pederasty and prostitution which involves a 
wasteful scattering of sperm (at 151-152), the planting of seeds that do not bear proper fruit (at 150), democracy 
which is at the disposal of everyone (at 144-145), the festival which subverts the order of the city (at 142), as 
well as the outlaw, the pervert, and the vagrant (at 144). Writing is therefore tied to immorality, to a perverted 
politics, to pleasures without paternity (at 151). This natural tendency, of for example sperm to disseminate, must 
according to Plato be tied down, submitted to the law of the logos. This can happen only when the father remains 
present; otherwise ‘nature’ takes its course.  
32
  See in general Derrida [13; 19].  
33
 Derrida, in pointing to other versions of the myth, follows the example of Lévi-Strauss [29, pp. 216-217] who 
convincingly advocates an approach which does not seek for the most authentic or earliest version of a myth, but 
takes account of all versions of a myth in reading it; see also Derrida [7, pp. 286-287]. 
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the similarities. In these myths Ra/Ammon (the hidden, the concealed) brings the 
world about through speech. Thoth is also sometimes depicted as a secondary god, as 
the son of Ra. He is the moon, created by Ra and takes the place of Ra at night, when 
Ra makes his journey back through the underworld. Like Hermes in Greek 
mythology, he is sometimes the messenger of the gods. He does not bring language 
into the world, but merely the differences in language or between languages. Thoth is 
however not only depicted as a peaceful and secondary god in Egyptian mythology. 
Just like the moon in an eclipse takes the place of the sun, Thoth sometimes openly 
revolts against Ra to usurp the throne. As in Freud’s primal horde [21, vol XIII pp. 
125, 141-146], he conspires with the sons to get rid of the father as well as with the 
brothers to get rid of the brother who has become the new king [18, p. 94]. He also 
tricks Ra by adding five extra days to the calendar (the epagomenic days) so as to 
assist Nout, who was cursed by Ra, in bearing children. Thoth sometimes even 
becomes the creator. He is simultaneously the god of calculation, arithmetic, rational 
sciences, occult sciences, astrology and alchemy. He is also the inventor of play and of 
games. The god of writing is, self-evidently as Derrida notes, also the god of death [18, 
p. 95]. He determines the length of the lives of men and gods, determines the weight 
of dead souls, and is in charge of dressing the dead [18, pp. 95-96]. He can thus put 
an end to life as well as heal the sick and even the dead; he is the god of the 
pharmakon, which explains Thamus’s reticence in accepting the gift he offers. Thoth 
is even more importantly sometimes depicted as the Ibis (his sacred bird which is also 
the shape of his face) that lays the egg from which Ra is born. Thoth, because of his 
role of substitution and replacement, can be said to be the god of non-identity [18, p. 
96]. He does not have a proper place and also no proper name. He is the father’s 
other and also the other of the sun and of the Good. He is both other and the same. As 
Derrida [18, pp. 96-97] notes, the god of writing is ‘at once his father, his son, and 
himself’ and likens him to a joker in a pack of cards which has the role of a floating 
signifier, a wild card that ‘puts play into play’. Implicitly invoking (and subverting) 
first Hegel and then Heidegger, Derrida [18, p. 97] notes that Thoth - 
 
would be the mediating movement of dialectics if he did not also mimic it, 
indefinitely preventing it, through this ironic doubling, from reaching some final 
fulfilment or eschatological reappropriation. Thoth is never present. Nowhere does 
he appear in person. No being-there can properly be his own. 
  
Let us now enquire in more detail into the notion of the father of logos (Ra/Ammon) 
who is referred to in the above myth [18, pp. 80-89]. This will give us greater insight 
into what Derrida understands under the metaphysics of presence and what inspires 
it. In Plato’s other texts, pater (the father) is also, in line with its possible meanings, 
the chief, the capital and the Good. Interesting about these father analogues is that 
according to Plato they cannot be spoken of directly, just as one cannot behold the 
sun34 directly.35 The Good, Plato notes in the Republic [36, p. 509b], ‘is not being but 
                                                 
34
 Plato in the Republic [36, p. 508c] refers to the sun in the visible realm as an analogy to the Good in the 
intelligible realm. The sun, itself an offspring of the Good, in other words ‘stands in the visible world in the same 
  
15 
 
superior to it in rank and power’. One can consequently not use logos, rational 
thinking, to address that from which logos, which in turn assembles and 
distinguishes all onta (beings), originates, that to which reason must account [18, pp. 
87-88].36 The difficulty with this inability to speak directly of the origin, this fear of 
being blinded by the origin, is that it creates the risk of deception, of bad faith. 
Socrates [36, p. 507a] consequently also warns his audience to be careful that in 
speaking about the father he does not deceive them unintentionally. Because the 
Good cannot be known, because it absents itself, becomes invisible, the possibility 
always exists that when one speaks of its offspring, its supplements (such as logos), 
one may, albeit unintentionally, deceive the audience. The likelihood of this 
happening increases due to the fact that, as Socrates points out in the Phaedo [36, pp. 
99d-100a], the construction of logos is aimed at protecting one from the danger of 
directly looking at the sun. It is therefore possible that logos could be very different 
from the way in which Plato depicts it. We saw earlier that the sophists also 
sometimes condemned writing, not because it corrupts memory and the truth, but 
because of its breathless impotence to adapt itself to the particular situation as 
compared to speech [18, pp. 116-117]. Gorgias, regarded as one of the founders of 
sophism, then also presents to us an alternative view of logos which is not from the 
outset associated with truth. Logos here bears a very different, more indeterminate 
meaning, with Gorgias calling logos a pharmakon – both good and bad, a seductive, 
disproportionate power akin to witchcraft and magic that can be used to persuade 
someone of anything. According to Gorgias, this happened against her will to Helen, 
who is usually blamed for causing the Trojan War. Logos is because of what happened 
to Helen indicted by Gorgias because of its capacity to lie. Only after having pointed 
to the indeterminate nature of logos does Gorgias proceed to posit the order of truth 
as a counterpart of logos, in this way anticipating the Platonic gesture, that is, of 
deriving the truth from the pharmakon. Before being tamed to become the loyal son 
and the truth by Plato, logos is thus a wild ambivalent creature which can enter and 
bewitch the soul with ‘the power to break in, to carry off, to seduce internally, to 
ravish invisibly’ [18, p. 118].37 If logos is viewed thus, it would of course make of 
Socrates (the spokesman of the father, the one who does not write) a magician and a 
sophist, a pharmakeus par excellence, something which he shares with Thoth, and as 
we will see now, also with Eros [18, pp. 94, 119, 147]. In the Symposium Socrates 
                                                                                                                                                         
relation to vision and visible things as that which the good itself bears in the intelligible world to intelligence and 
to intelligible objects’ [18, p. 87]. 
35
 Freud in Totem and taboo [21, vol XIII, pp. 41-51] discusses the appearance of this feature in archaic 
communities where the chief is regarded as being taboo in the sense that he cannot be approached and viewed 
directly, but only through intermediaries. This is because of the mysterious and dangerous magical power that is 
believed to emanate from him and corresponds with the belief of a boy in the excessive powers of his father. 
There is nonetheless ambivalence in this relation because of a simultaneous distrust of the father, and which 
finds expression in the practice that the chief must be guarded, but also guarded against. Freud is of the view that 
remnants of this belief still persist in modern societies (at 43). See furthermore Freud [21, vol XII p. 54] on the 
sun as ‘nothing but another sublimated symbol for the father’. Derrida [18, p. 88] seems to allude here to these 
texts of Freud. 
36
 As clearly appears from these passages, the question of the origin of reason has been a topic of discussion 
since the dawn of philosophy. One should therefore be careful not to assume too quickly that Derrida’s enquiry 
into reason’s origin (which is to be clearly distinguished from an opposition to reason) amounts to a 
‘performative inconsistency’ as contended for example by Solum [38, p. 484].  
37
 Socrates was as we saw, similarly seduced out of the city, but by ‘writing’. 
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recounts the (necessarily) contradictory terms in which Diotima (an Athenian 
priestess) explained to him the nature of Eros (claiming that he does not have 
knowledge of Eros himself). Eros is a demonic species as he is neither mortal nor 
immortal, he springs to life and dies again on the same day, he is never without 
resources, nor is he ever rich:  
 
[Eros] is always poor, and he’s far from being delicate and beautiful (as ordinary 
people think he is); instead he is tough and shrivelled and shoeless and 
homeless…always living with Need ....[He is however also] a schemer after the 
beautiful and the good; he is brave, impetuous and intense, an awesome hunter, 
always weaving snares, resourceful in his pursuit of intelligence, a lover of wisdom 
[a philosopher] through all his life, a genius with enchantment, potions 
[pharmakeus] and clever pleadings [sophist] [36, p. 203d-e]. 
 
As noted earlier, Socrates is in the Symposium as well as in Meno, referred to by 
Plato’s other discussants as a magician because of his use of logos, in similar terms as 
described by Gorgias [18, pp. 119-121]. He fights one pharmakon by invoking 
another. Eros, Socrates, writing and even logos (speech) all seem to share the 
characteristics of the pharmakon, being able to enter and seduce the body and the 
soul. What is this other pharmakon that is fought against?38 Derrida [18, pp. 123-124] 
contends, quoting from Plato’s the Laws, that the power of witchcraft and occult 
medicine lies in the fear of death of the child within us. The father, the sun, and the 
Good, it appears, are invoked in light of the fear of death, which is like the 
pharmakon without self-identical meaning and can neither be possessed nor known. 
Plato and philosophy after him seek to efface this fear through turning by means of 
sorcery (dialectics) that which is indeterminate, that which shares the characteristics 
of Eros and the pharmakon, that which is without fixed identity, into the easy-to-
handle metaphysical oppositions of good/evil, proper/improper, logos/mythos. Law 
has a similarly important and contributory role in this respect. As Plato points out, 
and Derrida reminds us, it is not by accident that the two words for law (nomos) and 
intelligence or mind (nous) are so similar [18, pp. 124-125]. Plato, in spite of his 
denigration of writing elsewhere, points out that to ensure its permanence, law must 
be written down. It furthermore has to be internalised by the good judge as an 
antidote (alexipharmaka) against other forms of corruptive discourse such as poetry 
and prose. The function of a judge as preserver of the state furthermore sometimes 
necessarily involves prescribing death as a cure (iama) for those who engage in folly, 
cowardice and immorality. Dialectics, law, self-knowledge and self-mastery, Derrida 
[18, p. 125] notes, all share the same function of exorcism against the fear and desire 
of the child within us. With Plato, this is effected through the notion of an immortal 
soul tied to a metaphysics of constant presence, the presence of the father, the sun. 
Plato therefore posits, for example in the Phaedo, the eidos (the ideas of the True, the 
Beautiful and the Good) that is invisible, that always remains the same, uniform by 
itself, never tolerates any change and that can be grasped only through the reasoning 
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 As should already be clear, the question ‘what is?’ is strictly speaking inappropriate in relation to the 
pharmakon as it has no identity. 
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power of the mind [36, pp. 78d-79c]. The eidos can in other words, like law, be 
repeated as the same, as compared to the particulars that constantly change, as 
compared to the inevitable fate of mortal beings [18, p. 126]. In the Crito, Socrates is 
then also asked to accept (his sentence of) death as well as, and in the name of, the 
laws of the city. The eidos and the laws, the pharmakon-logos that need to oppose the 
pharmakon of the sophists as well as the bewitching fear of death, are also called by 
the names of truth, the episteme, dialectics, and philosophy [18, p. 127)]. Logos, 
functioning as we saw, as an antidote, is thus ‘inscribed within the general alogical 
economy of the pharmakon’ [18, p. 127].  
 
The origin of philosophy, what is usually said to involve the movement from mythos 
to logos thus entails a more complex manoeuvre. Derrida’s contention is that we have 
been deceived up until now by philosophy, which is ultimately a metaphysics of 
presence. An enquiry into the notion of the father will clarify this further. The notion 
of a father (of a child, a son, a daughter) is of course a construction based on rational 
argumentation, calculation, inference. For this, language or living discourse (logos) is 
required. The (notion of a) father thus in a strange sense ‘originates’ in logos. The son 
(logos) is, like Thoth, thus actually the father of the father; the father is an effect of 
the son [33, pp. 12-13]. As we furthermore saw above, logos itself is inscribed in the 
alogical economy of the pharmakon, which it seeks to hide from itself. This ties in 
with what happens in the Phaedrus when Socrates recounts the myth of the origin of 
writing. Derrida [18, p. 79] points out in this regard that the truth of writing is not 
presented by Socrates through rational, living discourse or logos. It is instead 
presented through a fable, the truth concerning which Socrates notes that it cannot be 
discovered in oneself by oneself as compared to the knowledge which one can find in 
oneself by oneself [18, pp. 79-80]. This truth, or rather the non-truth of writing is 
then told by Socrates by repeating a fable. Socrates thus repeats without knowing 
whether it is actually true, a myth about writing, thereby doing exactly what writing is 
itself accused of (that is, repeating without truth) and in this way installs the primacy 
of logos. In constituting itself, philosophy thus has to invoke the pharmakon of 
‘writing’ to cast it out.39 Philosophy can be said to involve an exorcism, a magic 
incantation against ‘writing’ as pharmakon, a counter-poison against the effects of 
poison, against the fear of death. In contrast to the eidos, the pharmakon has - 
 
no stable essence, no “proper” characteristics, it is not, in any sense (metaphysical, 
physical, chemical, alchemical) of the word, a substance. The pharmakon has no 
ideal identity; it is aneidetic…. It is … the prior medium in which differentiation in 
general is produced [18, pp. 128-129].40  
 
The pharmakon of ‘writing’ is already lodged inside of philosophy and what 
philosophy constantly attempts to do is exorcise it. Philosophy does this by invoking 
                                                 
39
 The ‘writing’ that is invoked is as we will see in par 8 below not to be equated with writing in the usual sense 
and is closely associated with death. 
40
 Derrida [18, p. 130] similarly describes the pharmakon as ‘the differance of difference’. See further 
Philosophy in a time of terror where Derrida [17, p. 124] remarks on the similarity between the autoimmunitary 
logic which he explores in his later texts and the pharmakon. 
  
18 
 
the presence of the father to cast out death. It makes death acceptable by annulling it 
through the idea of the immortality of the soul [18, p. 126)]. It doubles or catches the 
pharmakon, erects the eidos to ensure itself of the presence of the father and 
simultaneously turns the pharmakon into the other of the metaphysical opposition. 
The latter is then presented with its two opposing sides being unaffected by each 
other – a pure inside with an external outside. At the same time, as we saw above, the 
outside affects and remains a threat to the purity and essence of the inside [18, pp. 
130-131]. Philosophy thus still trades in mythology: a mythology of a pure origin, a 
living organism, to which its other was added only afterwards, thereby distorting the 
purity of the inside. But as we saw now, this purity is bought through subterfuge, 
through myth, through magical incantation. This incantation, which can be detected 
only in its margins, is repeated in all philosophical texts since Plato. Only in this way 
can what should be on the outside be kept out, and the purity of the inside, the self-
identity of that which is, its being, be restored.  
 
8 ‘Writing’ as pre-origin 
 
We still need to enquire in detail into the kettle logic Plato uses in referring to writing 
in order to understand something more of the ‘other sense’ of writing which is at 
stake in Plato’s pharmacy. We already saw above that in Derrida’s reading, kettle 
logic (here the exclusion of writing and its simultaneous invocation) happens for 
fundamental reasons [18, p. 157]. In Plato’s texts this kettle logic finds expression 
inter alia as follows: ‘Writing’ is valued ‘positively’ in the implicit references to 
‘origin’: the seduction effected by a written speech, drawing Socrates out of the city to 
engage in discourse (logos) as well as in the Delphic inscription to know the truth 
which Socrates takes to heart. At a certain point in the Phaedrus, writing however 
becomes the illegitimate, bastard brother of logos. Logos, the legitimate brother, is at 
this point nonetheless remarkably introduced as in itself a form of writing, more 
precisely, as an inscription of truth in the soul [18, pp. 148-149].41 In order to justify 
Plato’s own writing, Socrates furthermore notes in the Phaedrus [36, p. 226d] that it 
is acceptable to write as an amusement to oneself, as a reminder to oneself for when 
one reaches a forgetful age as well as for those who wish to follow in one’s footsteps 
on the path of truth [18, pp. 153-154]. Plato moreover invokes the letters of the 
alphabet (that is, writing) when he tries to explain the differences between good and 
bad in music and poetry. He does the same when in the Timaeus he goes beyond the 
usual conceptual opposition between the sensible and the intelligible and defines the 
origin of the world in terms of a trace, a receptacle, an originary inscription, a nurse, a 
mother [18, pp. 158-159].42 Plato in the Philebus furthermore invokes Theuth in a 
more ‘positive’ sense, as the inventor of grammar as a science of differences.  
 
These invocations of writing point, Derrida [18, p. 149] suggests, in addition to 
writing in the usual sense, also to writing in a different ‘sense’, even though all Plato 
may have wanted to do was to distinguish between writing and speech. This is a 
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 See further Derrida [7, p 227] where he reads this as a reference to the ‘psychical trace’; see further below. 
42
 Plato incidentally invokes dreams in the same context to further explain this idea [18, p. 159]; see also at 168. 
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reference to what Derrida calls general writing or the arche-trace. The way in which 
ordinary writing and general writing relate to each other, can be explained by again 
referring to ‘psychic’ or dream writing [7, pp. 209-210].43 In ‘Freud and the Scene of 
Writing’ Derrida [7, p. 207]44 describes ‘psychic’ or dream writing with reference to 
Freud as ‘[n]ot a writing which simply transcribes, a stony echo of muted words, but a 
lithography before words: metaphonetic, non-linguistic, alogical’.45 Dream writing is 
in other words not transcribed or translated from an already existing or past present 
unconscious text, but is originary in nature [7, pp. 210-213]. At this point we 
furthermore need to recall our earlier discussion of the text of dreams being woven 
around a point which cannot be untied, or what Derrida refers to in ‘Freud and the 
scene of writing’ as a trace left behind which has never been perceived or lived 
consciously [7, p. 214]. In Différance the trace is similarly, shortly after a discussion 
of Freud’s death instinct, which as Derrida points out involves an expenditure without 
reserve, said to be ‘of something that can never present itself; it is itself a trace that 
can never be presented, that is, can never appear and manifest itself as such in its 
phenomenon’ [5, pp. 150, 154]. The arche-trace, which effaces itself in its appearance 
[5, pp. 154-156], is in other words left by that which Derrida in The post card [8, pp. 
397-399] in his reading of Freud’s Beyond the pleasure principle [21, vol XVIII pp. 1-
64] refers to as the desire for unlimited pleasure, a desire in other words for death (a 
kind of painful pleasure similar to the pharmakon).  
 
As we saw in the preceding discussion, and as Plato’s pharmacy illustrates, this 
desire as well as the process involved in dream writing finds expression in texts in 
general. In ‘Freud and the scene of rriting’, just after analysing the process of ‘psychic 
writing’, Derrida [7, p. 213] describes the process through which language and 
meaning is produced as follows: 
 
Force produces meaning (and space) through the power of “repetition” alone, 
which inhabits it originarily as its death. This power, that is, this lack of power, 
which opens and limits the labor of force, institutes translatability, makes possible 
what we call “language”. 
 
Language, not only in the form of writing, but also in the form of speech (both making 
use of signs which can be repeated) must in other words be understood as similar to 
‘psychic’ or dream writing. With reference to the passage quoted above, language 
involves a ‘translation’ of the arche-trace or of general writing which strictly speaking 
cannot be translated, as the arche-trace effaces itself in its appearance and is 
therefore nowhere present. This ‘secondariness’ does not however affect the originary 
nature of the ‘translation’ [7, p. 212; 6, pp. 44-73]. We saw how this ‘translation’ takes 
                                                 
43
 Derrida [7, pp. 219-220] points out in this regard that Freud came to realise to an increasing extent that the 
process of dream-work can be better expressed by writing with its relations to space, time and difference, than 
through speech, and through hieroglyphic writing perhaps best of all. 
44
 In this text, Derrida [7, pp. 196-231] incidentally makes reference a number of times to the Phaedrus (at 221-
222, 227). 
45
 The term ‘psychic’ must be qualified as the ‘writing’ which is at stake here actually precedes the distinction 
between the physical and the psychic.  
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place in the Phaedrus by way of all the mechanisms which are similar to those which 
usually operate in dream-work. These mechanisms, we now see, are set in motion by 
a certain ‘desire’ as well as by the movement of différance, which in itself refers to 
this ‘desire’. In Plato’s pharmacy Derrida hints at this ‘desire’ with his analysis of the 
treatment which ‘writing’ receives from Plato, as well as in the analysis of Eros, 
Theuth, Socrates, seduction, death, pain and pleasure in the Phaedrus. Writing here 
represents death as well as jouissance, that is, extreme pleasure or sexual orgasm, 
which of course shares the features or rather lack of identity of Eros, Thoth and 
Socrates.46 Death can consequently no longer be viewed as it usually is in metaphysics 
as in opposition to life, that is, as life’s other. Life instead amounts to an economy of 
death [8, p. 359].47  
 
Through the ‘notions’ of absolute pleasure and the trace, the kettle logic which Plato 
and others employ, can now be understood, specifically through the ‘notions’ of 
‘general writing’ and the ‘arche-trace’. As we see at the start of the Phaedrus with 
Socrates being seduced out of the city walls, it is a written text which provokes 
ultimate desire, erotic madness, absolute pleasure.48 This ultimate pleasure, which is 
given expression to in ‘general writing’ or the arche-trace, is positioned on the ‘inside’ 
and is appealed to by Plato in certain instances (albeit not intentionally) because of 
the inability of the idea of self-presence to give a full account of origin. That which is 
associated with non-truth, here specifically writing, myth (Boreas and Orithyia, the 
cicadas, the origin of writing) and mere repetition without knowledge (Diotima’s 
account of the madness of Eros) therefore need to be invoked to give an account of 
the origin of metaphysics with its dialectic and hierarchical oppositions.49 The 
positioning of ‘writing’ on the ‘inside’, is at times implicitly acknowledged by Plato, 
for example with reference to the finite nature of memory and the threat which 
writing poses, thereby referring to the force of forgetting that is constantly at work on 
the ‘inside’.50 At stake here is no longer an ‘origin’ in the metaphysical sense, which as 
we saw, is always tied to purity and self-presence, but rather a pre- or non-origin.  
 
9 A ‘politics’ beyond metaphysical logic 
 
Philosophical discourse has, for the reasons indicated, been constructed in terms of a 
living being with an inside and an outside. This Platonic system has informed and 
constituted legal discourse in the West with its historical exclusion and condemnation 
of others. Plato’s pharmacy shows that what is ultimately feared in effecting these 
exclusions is death, resulting in a turn towards that which provides security, that is, a 
                                                 
46
 Derrida [7, pp. 229, 231; 6, p. 88] derives this relation between writing and sexuality inter alia from Freud [21, 
vol XX, pp. 89-90] and Melanie Klein’s The role of the school in the libidinal development of the Cchild [27, pp. 
66, 71].  
47
 See also Derrida [18, p. 97; 6, p. 69]. 
48
 See also Derrida [6, p. 312]. 
49
 Referring here again to the mechanism at stake in dreams, we can say that fiction in the form of myth as a rule 
lends itself better to the ‘representability’ of the unknown, of death. Derrida’s reading of writers such as Maurice 
Blanchot is of relevance here. See furthermore Lévi-Strauss [31, pp. 45, 54] on the novel as the successor of 
myth in the Western world.  
50
 See above. 
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privileging of the home, the authentic, the true, reason, the proper, and/or the 
subject. In analysing the forces at stake which produce these effects, Plato’s 
pharmacy amounts in a certain sense to a ‘psychoanalysis’ of Western philosophical 
thinking.51 This is so in a ‘certain sense’ only, because the conceptuality of 
psychoanalysis is itself caught within metaphysics [7, p. 197]. The metaphor of writing 
which haunts Western discourse nevertheless ties in closely with some aspects of 
Freud’s thinking.52 Writing is of course not condemned or degraded by all 
philosophers, but as neurotic patients with their unsuccessful repressions revealed to 
Freud the unconscious forces at work in everyone, the unsuccessful ‘repression’ of 
writing by Plato (as well as Rousseau and Saussure) points for Derrida to that which 
conditions all philosophy. This is because of what writing represents: death, which is 
both feared and desired, as Freud contended. It is in other words Freud’s thinking, 
amongst others, which enables Derrida to enquire into the conditions of possibility of 
the Platonic system and to establish its inscription within différance. The latter at the 
same time makes the Platonic system with its hierarchical oppositions following its 
inside/outside logic, strictly speaking impossible, or in simpler terms, points to its 
unfounded nature. This allows us to contend that the subject who in legal discourse 
posits reason and law cannot provide the system with a foundation or an origin as it 
professes to do, but is itself an effect of différance. Plato’s pharmacy - and the same 
applies to all of Derrida’s texts – thus goes far beyond providing legal scholars with an 
illustration of the multiple meanings underlying texts, or with tools for overturning 
hierarchical oppositions in law. These readings of Plato’s pharmacy essentially keep 
the metaphysical concepts of subjectivity and truth in place. Différance instead shows 
that law, like philosophy, has installed itself through a dissimulation of its pre-
origins. The origin of self-present subjectivity upon which modern law erects itself so 
as to construct democracy as a return to the self, reason as calculation in terms of a 
restricted economy, and the sovereignty of the nation-state, serve as an anti-dote to 
the fear and desire of death, to the a-logical economy of the pharmakon. In his later 
texts on hospitality, which tie in closely with Plato’s pharmacy, Derrida shows that 
this a-logical economy calls for absolute hospitality, for the subject, in both its 
individual and collective sense, to become a hostage [15, pp. 55-57]. Because of the 
withdrawal of the idea, or the ‘parricide’ referred to above, hospitality is no longer a 
concept in the strict sense (a signified or idea, tied to a signifier), but a concept which 
autodeconstructs [16, p. 362], similar to the pharmakon. Hospitality, like law, thus 
has no essence, and need to be thought of in terms of its inscription within différance, 
as a tension between unconditional and conditional hospitality. Perhaps only in this 
way, metaphysics and its manifestations in the legal context such as subjectivity, 
sovereignty, reason, calculation, legality and legitimacy, can be exceeded in a mad a-
temporal moment of suspension. 
 
                                                 
51
  See similarly Derrida [7, pp. 196-197] on Of grammatology [6]. One of the very few secondary texts which 
show an appreciation of this, as well as of the importance of Freud’s thinking in the development of the ‘notion’ 
of general writing is Spivak’s Preface to Of grammatology [39, pp. xxxviii-xlvi]. 
52
 See further Derrida [6, pp. 159-161]. 
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